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ABSTRACT
This chapter investigates the challenges faced by sell-side analysts in engaging with companies with 
material stranded assets through the lens of Becksian risk society theory. The research unravels the 
usefulness of sustainability reports in deriving the intrinsic value of energy companies in the UK, and 
whether they take Environmental Social and Governance (ESG) factors into consideration in doing so. 
Qualitative data were collected via dual methods comprising longitudinal participant observation at IR 
meetings and interview of sell-side analysts and institutional shareholder. Findings indicate dissatisfac-
tion with the existing risk reporting system is a key factor in divestment decisions and asset stranding. 
The growing Responsible Investment (RI) awareness notwithstanding, the inadequate risk reporting 
system continues to represent a major source of agitation amongst shareholders and analysts, making 
the overhaul of the current financial reporting system inevitable.
INTRODUCTION
Some of the world’s most valuable and powerful companies, that is energy companies, have a huge prob-
lem that may either reduce their intrinsic future value due to the risks and uncertainties attached to their 
future cash slows, or make the shares to be totally worthless. These companies have substantial billions 
of dollars’ worth of proved reserves made up of coal oil and gas under the heading of ‘unsold inventories’ 
in their balance sheets. Owning much of these reserves is the source of massive power and high market 
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value1. Power derives from the incidence of the existent ‘global technological society’ where essentials 
of such as food, commerce, communication, transportation and industry are driven by these energy mix, 
whilst their value derives from the intrinsic valuation (commonly based on the present value of future 
cash flows arising from the sale of energy products). In 2018, $2 trillion in global annual revenue was 
generated by upstream (exploration and drilling activities) energy companies, and the sector generates 
up to $90 billion in GDP, representing up to 3% of the global economy2. In recent times however, the 
declining value of these companies has become a source of worry to institutional investors because the 
future returns accruable to the beneficiaries of institutional investments are linked to the ability of the 
investee companies to generate future cash flows which is reflected in their respective market capitalisa-
tion. As at August 2019, market capitalisation of the top 20 of the world’s energy companies is worth 
$1.7 trillion which reflects a 55% cumulative decline when compared with the highest value ever attained 
(see table 1). Literature reveals that the declining value is traceable to factors such as stigmatization by 
environmental campaigners, legislative uncertainties multiple compression arising from weakness in 
corporate governance, and divergence in the basis for valuation in the investment community. Recent 
empirical evidence has shown that stigmatisation can influence compression in trading volumes whereby 
a misalignment exists between ability to generate future cash flow and intrinsic value. For instance, Ros-
neft produces 2.3 million barrels per day, which is slightly more than ExxonMobil. However, Rosneft 
is valued at roughly 18% of the value of ExxonMobil. The problem of uncertainty about the future, and 
the problem of environmental risks have called into question, the validity of the Gordons growth model 
used in estimating over or undervaluation of shares (Cho, 1988). These uncertainties may lead to lower 
intrinsic valuation of equities in these companies due to greater worries about their ability to generate 
future cash flows, or in worst case scenario, inability to finance new projects leading and the inability 
to generate fresh working capital, therefore making it impossible to continue as a going concern.
Two puzzling problems that have arisen therefore, are the challenge of how to access ESG risk in-
formation that would assist equity shareholders and their sell-side analysis analysts in making valuation 
decisions, and how to quantify them in the valuation of equity shares. Traditionally, business valuation 
methods such as the capitalisation of future income, asset based, and market-based approaches have 
been used (Pratt, 2008, Damodaran, 2005). Currently ESG risk information are available on historical 
basis through the annual publication of sustainability reports which the shareholders and analysts find 
inadequate. This research is therefore interested in investigating the basis for arriving at risk information 
for decision making when trading in equity shares.
RESEARCH IN CONTEXT
Stranded Assets
Energy derived from fossil fuel have been fingered in various scientific reports as being a chief source 
of global warming, and that their continual use would make the earth to be susceptible to catastrophic 
climate change that may cost trillions of dollars in environmental damages. In order to prevent the oc-
currence of this environmental damages, these reserves would have to be discarded, which means that 
they would be ‘stranded’ in the ground, leading to material diminution in the value of these companies. 
It is estimated that adherence to the Paris Agreement (2015) adopted as a legal framework by the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) means that half of all known gas reserves, 
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a third of all known oil reserves and 80% of all known coal reserves will have to stay in the ground. 
This fear has been further exacerbated by the plan by the EU to be carbon-neutral by 2050. If all these 
reserves have to stay in the ground, then they would become worthless. Worthless inventories mean the 
companies would also be worthless except they diversify their portfolio of energy products away from 
these environmentally-damaging products. This is why economists are beginning to call these worthless 
reserves “stranded assets.” It means that the more these companies discover new reserves of oil, coal or 
gas, the more they are adding to the stranded assets to their books. It is expected that when economic 
agents eventually realise the intrinsic value of these assets, the market price of these energy companies 
is expected to be hit, making the value to go up in smoke. If this carbon bubble scenario plays out as 
expected, then it is likely to cause premature write-off of equities held in investee companies held by 
institutional investors, with implications for the realisation of future pensions and other attendant social 
costs.
The latest analyses (IPCC, 2019; IISD, 2018) suggests that in order to meet the global emissions 
target of not more than 2o rise in atmospheric temperature, emissions need to remain within the carbon 
budget of 500 – 900 Giga tons CO2 by 2050, which is far less than what would be emitted if all the all 
the worlds current oil coal and gas reserves are burned (that is 2,860 Giga tons), resulting in higher 
Table 1. Market capitalisation of the world top 20 energy companies (in billions of dollars)
Company Aug 2019 Aug 2017 Highest historical value and date
Exxon Mobil 286.3 342.1 519.3 October 2007
British Petroleum 125.11 113.6 263.3 May 2006
Chevron Corporation 221.79 197.7 256.1 July 2014
CNOOC 63.85 48.9 120.9 April 2011
ConocoPhillips 57.67 54.4 112.6 June 2008
Eni 53.75 54.6 152.4 May 2008
Enterprise Products 61.77 58 77.2 May 2008
EOG Resources 42.12 52.3 64.5 June 2014
Equinor ASA 56.34 53.6 135.3 May 2008
Halliburton 15.77 37.1 63 July 2014
Kinder Morgan 45.86 42.8 96.5 April 2015
Occidental Petroleum Corporation 38.56 45.8 90.3 May 2011
Petrobras 85.31 52.1 329.9 May 2008
PetroChina 87.81 112.2 472.1 October 2007
Phillips 66 43.14 42.7 50 November 2015
Royal Dutch Shell 223.57 218.7 458.6 January 2013
Schlumberger 43.73 91.5 153.4 June 2014
Sinopec 3.048 95.16 131.2 October 2007
Suncor Energy 44.39 48.7 74.9 March 2011
Total 127.47 121.2 201.1 May 2008
Aggregate 1727.358 1883.16 3822.6
Source: Researcher’s findings.
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atmospheric temperature. Except there is an accelerate development and deployment of carbon capture 
technology, the effect would be catastrophic on the environment. New research by carbon tracker shows 
that just the reserves owned by companies listed on the stock exchanges contain enough carbon to create 
more than 762 Giga tons of CO2 and those companies are currently spending $764 billion annually to 
find yet more reserves. If carbon limits are enforced in the future, then less fuel would be consumed and 
reserves would become ‘stranded assets’ which would no longer provide financial returns. If the trend 
continues, listed companies alone would cause more global warming than all other economic agents.
Another latest research depicts a gory picture. Pfeiffer et al., (2018) took stock of the embodied emis-
sions of all the fleets of power plants installed all over the world (coal, gas, fossil fuel plants). Considering 
their age, running efficiency, utilisation factor, and anticipated emissions, they are expected to generate 
300 GtCO2. This is a problem because in order to achieve the Paris goals of 2oC above the pre-industrial 
levels, we have a budget 300 GtCO2. This is 60 GtCO2 over budget. In addition to this, there is $7trillion 
of potential new spent on new plants most of them in Asia, that would be additional 270 GtCO2. That 
leaves us with a dilemma. Either we build those plants and then we shut down the existing ones, or we 
install carbon capture storage which is expensive. Or we give up on the climate change goals.
However, in the event of strict adherence to Paris Agreement, it will mean that the amount of gases 
that we can emit would have to be limited as well as the amount of fossil fuel that we can burn. Therefore, 
the fossil fuel and coal and gas would have to stay in the ground. All these infrastructures being built to 
extract them would be stranded. There would be economic and social implications if this happens. There 
are a few countries that rely on these energy sources as the main means of generating revenue, that is, 
poor countries like Libya, Venezuela, and Nigeria. These places would have to adapt quickly to reduce 
social upheavals. Another implication is that it would tear a material hole in public budgets which means 
that governments would have to do more to compensate for the hole in the overall economy.
Previous evidence from practitioners show that divestment for achieving social purposes is not totally 
new. History has shown that such trend is not new. For instance, there was a wave of divestment in the 
70s and 80s against companies based in South Africa as well as tobacco companies too. However, the 
current wave of divestment against environmentally damaging companies became rife in 2015 after the 
Paris Agreement (2015) was signed. For instance, a coalition of institutional investors known as 350.org 
was formed around the same time to influence institutional investors’ freezing of fresh investments in 
fossil fuel companies in the short term, as well as total divestment from them in the long term (Ansar et 
al., 2013). In the same vein, Caldecott et al., (2018) have traced the occurrence of stranded asset prob-
lem to the natural consequence of the creative destruction which usually typify capitalism. For instance, 
Metcalfe (2002) demonstrated that the underlying impulse that keeps the engine of capitalism rolling 
comes from continuous innovation which invariably leads to the demise of the old ones.
Theory of Risk in Valuation
A significant role was played by Beck (1992, 1997) and Giddens (1990, 1991) in deepening our under-
standing of the sociology of risk in the post-industrial era, especially as it relates to the risks pertain-
ing to environmental risks pertaining to the holding of long-term investment through the concepts of 
manufactured risks and trusts, which are subsets of the risk society theory. The risk society theory holds 
that modern society would be preoccupied with the future which generates the notion of risks and how 
they would be managed (Giddens and Pierson 1998, p209). According to Giddens, risk society springs 
from the growth of science and technology which is consequences of modernisation. Giddens carefully 
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distinguished between ‘external risks’ which are insurable traditional risks that typified the Middle 
Ages, and the ‘manufactured uninsurable risks’ of the modern era. Giddens opined that in the middle 
ages, social actors fear the losses that the environment could exact on them, whereas in the modern era, 
social entities are known to exact damages on the environment (1990). The features of the risk society 
environment include rapid changes in society whereby reforms would almost always lag behind these 
changes in what Giddens refer to as the juggernaut of modernity (1990). Risk society is characterised 
by organised irresponsibility (Beck 1994) whereby the social actors who created societal risks are not 
penalised or held to account due to misalignment in social structures and inability of the law and social 
Figure 1. Potential impact of stranded assets divestment campaign
Adapted from: Ansah et al., (2013)
Table 2. Typology of Environmental-related risk
SET SUBSET
Environmental change Climate change; natural capital depletion, degradation; biodiversity loss and decreasing species richness; air, land and water contamination; habitat loss; freshwater availability.
Resource landscapes Price and availability of different resources such as oil and gas, coal and other minerals and metals; e.g. shale gas revolution, phosphate availability, and rate earth metals.
Government regulations
Carbon pricing (via taxes and trading schemes) subsidy regimes (e.g. for fuels and renewables); air 
pollution regulation; voluntary and compulsory disclosure requirements; changing liability regimes 
and stricter licence conditions for operation; the ‘carbon bubble’ and international climate policy.
Technological change Falling clean technology costs (e.g. solar PV, onshore wind); disruptive technologies; GMO; and electric vehicles.
Social norms and consumer 
behaviour
Fossil fuel divestment campaign; product labelling and certification schemes; and changing consumer 
preferences.
Litigation and statutory 
interpretations Carbon liability; litigation; damages; and changes in the way existing laws are applied or interpreted.
Source: Researcher’s findings
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order to quickly capture and effect changes. These rapid changes would therefore influence the develop-
ment of responsibility culture to reduce the incidence of manufactured risk whereby social actors try to 
differentiate between products or services that carry low elements of uninsurable risks and the others 
which do not (Giddens 1998, p8). The prevalence of science and technology and the media also increases 
reflexive risk thinking attitude whereby social agents think about risk reduction or avoidance, and even 
when all risks have been reduced, attention would be paid to the existence of residual risks (Beck, 1992). 
In risk society new scientific discoveries will not solve risk problems, but rather exacerbate it because, 
the more new scientific products are developed, the more society is enmeshed in reflexive risk orienta-
tion. The reflexive attitude to risks leads to politics of risks whereby more politics would originate from 
non-political actors. For instance, each time a product or service is developed, it is backed up politically 
through effective debate mechanism (Bernstein, 1996). Becks noted that social entities that adopts a 
‘precautionary principle’ as a means of avoiding the politics of risks is likely to burin its fingers when 
the risk results into actual losses (Beck, 1994). Unfortunately, the risk society is a direct changeover to 
a new modernity, which means that there is no prior experience for social entities to leverage on.
The above concept of manufactured risks partly explains the reason behind the multiple compression 
and the stigmatization phenomena that had triggered divestment in the investment community. Unlike 
the ‘external risks’, the ‘uninsurable manufactured risks’ are dynamic, unpredictable and unquantifiable, 
thereby necessitating the clarification of the concept of trust in a risk society. Trust is central to the issue 
of valuation of equities as it functions based on the interplay of market forces which social entities rely 
on without questioning. There is a negative correlation between risk and trust, such that trust reduces 
when risk increases and vice versa (see Giddens 1990; Ekberg, 2007). There is proliferation of knowledge 
in risk society. The more new knowledge which invalidates the old ones become available, the more 
social entities are put on enquiry thereby weakening the level of trust in the system. Since there are no 
insurance against ‘manufactured risks’, re-embedding mechanism was suggested by Giddens (1991) as 
a means of restoring trust in abstract systems which may fail as a result of proliferation of knowledge in 
risk society. One of such re-embedding mechanisms that had evolved in recent times is the growth of the 
responsible investment (RI) logic which is premised on long-term ownership, stakeholder perspective, 
and the consideration of Environmental Social and Governance in appraising institutional investment. 
Some of the RI embedding mechanisms include divestment from environmentally damaging companies 
(negative screening), publication of sustainability reports (SR) which is enables shareholders to appraise 
risks inherent in their investment, and the use of investors’ relations (IR) meetings which is an engage-
ment method whereby shareholders are able to meet with management to discuss issues affecting future 
profits, liquidity and strategy of the company.
Risk Reporting
Conventionally, the published financial report serves as a useful source for the valuation decision-making 
for analysts and shareholders alike (Gniewosz, 1990). However, they suffer from the inherent limita-
tion of being historical in nature thereby making them limited for projecting into the future, especially 
when the business operates in a dynamic environment. Nevertheless, many researchers have argued for 
a radical rethinking of the stewardship perspective upon which the periodic financial reporting is based, 
so that a new accountability reporting system that takes the views of stakeholders into consideration 
can become the mainstream (Adam, 2006, Gray et al, 2004). This call has become pertinent due to the 
awareness of the need to price environmental damages and potential risks emanating therefrom, into 
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long-term decision-making. This need to ensure financialisation of environmental costs in estimating 
future cash flows has been intensified by researchers who have taken philosophical views which is ei-
ther deep ecocentric (Rimmel and Jonall, 2013) or anthropocentric (Jones and Solomon, 2013) views 
on how such accountability reports should look like, especially as the effect of climate change which 
has cascaded into the consideration of biodiversity, health and going concern fears (Atkins and Maroun, 
2018). Figure 2 below shows the increasing importance of environmental risks through the frequency in 
the use if ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’ from 1989 to 2009, based on publications contained in 
the Dow Jones Factiva database. These inadequacies in financial reporting have influenced analysts and 
shareholders to evolve new ways of appraising risks by users of such financial information.
The above inadequacies in financial reporting have influenced analysts and shareholders to evolve 
new ways of appraising risks by users of such financial information. This research attempts to docu-
ment the methods used by analysts and shareholders alike in appraising ESG risks in investment. These 
noticed inadequacies in stewardship have been heightened in the energy and extractive sectors that rely 
on the use of natural resources for its survival. Since the establishment of the ‘Triple Bottom Line’ 
concept (see Elkington, 1997), there has been a noticeable growth in the reporting of the environmental 
issues to shareholders under various names such as ‘CSR’ report, ‘sustainability reports’ and so on, with 
academic community paying attention to how climate change is reported (Solomon and Darby, 2005), 
appropriateness of the reporting framework (Gray et al.,1996), and their effectiveness (Thomson, 2007) 
and their usefulness for valuation of stranded assets (Caldecott, 2014). Scientific reports (see IPCC, 
2018; IEA2018, World Energy Outlook, 2018) have increased the awareness of the possibility of global 
warming having negative effect on the ability of extractive companies to generate future cash flows, 
leading to material diminution in the value of the companies’ equity shares.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
What are the challenges being faced by sell-side analysts in engaging with companies with stranded as-
sets? What are the bases for arriving at the risk information that they take into consideration in valuing 
equity shares? How can the existing sustainability reporting system be improved to provide the necessary 
Figure 2. Increasing incidence of environmentalism in reporting (1989-2009)
SOURCE: Eccles and Krzuz, 2010
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risk information useful for decision-making? Qualitative data were gathered from longitudinal participant 
observation at IR meetings and interview of institutional and individual shareholders. This is because 
valuation is not an exact science which is influenced by access to information and perception (Qu and 
Dumay, 2011). This work is rooted in interpretive philosophy with the risk society theory (See section 
2 above) arrived at based on an inductive approach, and an epistemological premise that realism can be 
both learnt and self-created.
Longitudinal participant observation was obtained from Investors’ Relations (IR) meetings attended 
in the UK over a 4 year period (2014 – 2017). The attendance at those meetings helped in developing a 
holistic understanding of the issues involved in issues driving valuation and how it affects shareholders, 
given that these shareholders are interested in information that would aid them in arriving at buy, sell or 
hold decisions (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002). Thirty-three persons were interviewed in total, made up of 
20 Individual shareholders and 13 institutional shareholders comprising of 7 pension Funds trustees, 2 
hedge funds owners, 2 Sovereign Wealth Funds trustees, and 2 faith-based investors. The interview was 
both and phenomenological in nature as it helped in confirming or refuting already
These two sources provided us with rich data that helped us to arrive at a balanced picture of the is-
sues involved in risk affecting valuation of shares. This also helped us in cross-checking the authenticity 
of data coming from diverse sources. This is because a shareholder may say something and do another 
not related to what had been said (see Arnould and Wallendorf, 1994). All the interviews took place on 
telephone between 2014 and 2018, and the interview duration was average of 15 minutes each. All the 
interviewees’ anonymity was guaranteed in order to ensure that they are free from bias. The interview 
was recorded, transcribed and coded via ‘NVIVO’, before the themes were generated (see Guest et al, 
2012; and Braun and Clark, 2006).
Table 3. List of interviewees (institutional investors)
Code Interviewee’s position in Pension Fund Interview duration (minutes)
PF1 Investor Relations Manager 18
PF2 Chief Executive 19
PF3 Head of Finance & Investment 27
PF4 Compliance Manager 29
PF5 Governance Manager 23
PF6 Finance Manager 23
PF7 Head of Finance 23
SWF1 Governance Manager 16
SWF2 Compliance Manager 25
HF1 Managing Director 12
HF2 Managing Director 8
FB1 Head of Investment 27
FB2 Head of Corporate Governance 32
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Analysis of IR Meetings
As a member of a shareholders association based in the UK, this analysis is based on participatory 
observation of investors’ relations meetings that took place in extractive companies meetings over a 4 
year period, and the analysis of the questions put forward to senior management. The meeting duration 
is usually for 1.5 hours, made up of 30 minutes presentation by management and an hour for questions 
and answers. Table 4 shows the cumulative changes over time (CCOT) of shareholders’ concerns in the 
extractive industries between 2014 and 2017. The need to develop new business strategy with reduced 
emphasis on fossil fuel was a major concern of the shareholders based on the number of questions asked 
at the IR meetings. However, there was a noticeable decline in the number of questions bothering on 
strategy from 2017 because the respective companies have started issuing ‘Global Outlook’ reports 
showing planned diversification from fossil fuel. For instance, BP plans to achieve 25% revenue from 
non-oil and gas sources from 2025. This is acceptable to many of the institutional investors, although 
the social activists and faith-based investors prefer an accelerated diversification.
Aside executive pay, the main ESG concern by shareholders based on questions raised at investors 
meetings are centred on the need for alternative business strategy and transparency. Traditionally the 
oil and gas companies in particular have expectations of future cash flows on the expectation that future 
demand for energy will continue to grow into the foreseeable future. In 2014, the quest for energy com-
panies to diversify was based on the need to avoid disasters similar to the oil spillage which occurred 
in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, which negatively affected share prices and prevented dividend 
payment. In April 2000, some activist investors had filed a failed shareholder proposal at BP, calling 
for the stoppage of its planned offshore operations, and asking the company to divert the investment to 
renewable energy sources. This call was being re-echoed in every meeting, and then dominated ques-
tions being asked at investors meetings in 2015 and 2016. However, from 2017, there is a noticeable 
decline in the ESG concerns arising from business strategy as most of the corporations publish global 
outlook and sustainability reports indicating material diversification into renewables. For instance, BP 
plc plans to achieve 25% revenue from non-oil and gas sources from 2025. Nevertheless, the global out-
look published by oil majors indicate that the oil and gas business model will remain strong till 2050 as 
fossil fuel demand will remain strong. Some shareholders believe that enough is not being done to limit 
temperatures to 2 degrees in fulfilment of the Paris Accord, and move away from low-carbon economy 
as new technologies in renewables may make their investment in oil and gas redundant sooner than 2040. 
This arrangement is acceptable to many of the institutional investors, although the social activists and 
faith-based investors prefer an accelerated diversification.
Questions bothering on transparency in reporting payments to foreign governments and communities 
was quite high in 2014, which was the time of passing the Act. Since then there has been a decline in the 
number of questions or concerns perhaps due to the satisfaction of the level of transparency resulting 
from the publication. Shareholders concerns bothered on the level of compliance expected, the level of 
inclusion of foreign operations, and the penalties for false declaration or non-compliance. Sharehold-
ers also demanded to know the level of compliance of the governments of the countries in which they 
operate, especially the ones where inadequate progress are being made with a view to divest from them. 
The ESG concerns of shareholders are now shifting to concerns around unreported embezzlements 
and bribes paid to government officials, undocumented payments to political parties, non-disclosure of 
the true beneficial owners, anti-money laundering activities, and the increasing poverty reported in oil 
producing countries, thereby threatening the ‘social licence’ or legitimacy of the companies. However, 
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directors are quick to point to the substantial CSR activities that they are engaged in within the local 
communities where they operate
Fears that anthropogenic rise in GHG attributed to fossil fuel is causing responsible investors to 
consider negative screening of their oil and gas portfolio. There were claims that almost 600 institutions 
companies with $3.4 trillion AUM have fully or partially negatively-screened away investments in oil 
and gas from their portfolios. Neo-Schumpeterian argument that investments are likely to follow the 
kondratiev wave as a result of the coming of age of an existing technological revolution partly explains 
the gradual stranding of oil and gas assets. There is a suggestion from published financial news, that 
the process is being accelerated by the planned governmental ban on fossil fuel vehicles between 2040 
and 2050. As a direct consequence of the governmental action, all the major oil and gas companies are 
now projecting a decline in oil exploration and drilling after 2040, although they still project to continue 
oil exploration in developing jurisdictions thereafter because of expected surge in energy needs which 
is unlikely to be met via available energy supplies. After 2040, renewables are projected to represent 
on average, 25% of the world total energy mix which is considered insignificant to accelerate material 
stranding of oil and gas companies.
Justifications for Risk Reporting
Interview demonstrated growing need for the replacement of the existing reporting system. Based on 
the observation of the investors’ relations meetings, it is clear that investors are dissatisfied with the 
existing sustainability reports, and they prefer to get a report which captures the risks on a real time, 
rather than historical basis.
…the sustainability reports are prepared on a boiler plate basis and therefore I waste my time reading 
it. Mind you, I am not saying that the concept of sustainability reporting is wrong. What I am saying is 
that the information that I need for active share ownership isn’t present, and that is the reason why I 
come to this meeting, basically to plug the gap…. PF7
Table 4. Shareholders concerns in extractive industries based on the number of questions asked at IR 
meetings
Shareholder’s concerns 2014 2015 2016 2017 CCOT Typical management’s response
Human rights abuse and 
combating poverty in the local host 
communities
8 8 4 4 -4
We invest in CSR including training the locals. We 
partner with civil societies for citizen engagement. 
We comply with all local laws.
Developing low carbon energy 
sources and change of business 
strategy
12 16 18 7 -5 Being addressed, albeit slower than shareholders expected.
Transparency in dealing with 
governments 8 6 6 5 -3
We support EITI initiative as it is the best way of 
achieving transparency in the industry.
Excessive pay, and non-linkage of 
executive pay to carbon emission 
and allied matters
4 6 7 14 +10
Reporting is sometimes in excess of governments 
requirements. Pay is linked to performance. We 
are significantly transforming the business risk, so 
specialist carbon expert at board level is unnecessary.
Source: researchers’ findings
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The above statement clearly shows that the investors are interested in SRs but the current reporting 
system does not meet their requirements. Preparing a real time SR will be expensive, but this demand is 
understandable in an age where technology has made it possible for reports to be available for viewing 
online.
….unfortunately it seems like management is not alive to their responsibility as far as adaptive strategy 
is concerned. I am not proposing that the close shop, but where is the evidence that this company would 
be around in 25-year time? We need hard evidence but it is shameful that despite the massive capital at 
their disposal, they are just playing ostrich like everyone else. 
From interviews as well as meeting observations, it is obvious that investors are concerned with 
profits generated now, but more importantly, how future strategies are adapting to new business reali-
ties. However, such expectations are not being met as the report is lacks focus on strategy. For instance, 
a shareholder may be willing to hold equity if there are evidence of diversification thus:
Table 5. Indicators to help assess a company’s risk exposure to climate change
Metric Proxy for Climate Change Risk Risk Type Level of Exposure
Proved oil and gas reserves as a proportion of total 
assets Exposure to stranded assets
Business strategy 
risk
Company 
exposure
Fossil fuel business as a proportion of the total 
business Exposure to stranded assets
Business strategy 
risk
Company 
exposure
Vulnerability to climate change of the countries in 
which the company operates Exposure to acute and chronic weather
Physical exposure
Country exposure
Revenue arising from fossil fuel sales as a 
proportion of total revenue Revenue vulnerability risks
Company 
exposure
Capital requirements from insurance exposure to 
weather-related catastrophic events as a percentage 
of total available capital
Insurance exposure to acute weather
Exploration and drilling (non-current) assets as a 
proportion of total assets
Present value of assets exposed to the 
risk of diminution in value of proved 
oil/gas reserves
Target for reducing CO2 emissions in the countries 
where the oil and gas company operates
Risk of adverse of environmental tax or 
regulations
Regulatory and 
legal
Country exposure
Company’s carbon footprint
Risk of adverse additional taxes or 
increased governmental scrutiny or 
regulations
Company 
exposure
Local litigation and governance activism culture Compliance and reputational risk Country exposure
Material non-compliance with major industry 
decarbonisation/sustainability initiatives Reputational damage
Reputational risks
Company 
exposure
History of bad “green” publicity Reputational damage
Size (by assets)
Reputational damage (the bigger the 
company, the more likely it could be 
targeted by activists)
Quality of disclosure Transparency of climate change exposure
Regulatory and 
legal
Source: Adapted from Petkov et al, (2016).
168
Valuation Challenges in Stranded Asset Scenarios
 
I am delighted to hear today that BP is actively diversifying into renewable such that a quarter of annual 
profits earned in 7 years’ time would be derived from renewables. 
Some shareholders believe that SR are inadequate but then, because they are institutional shareholders, 
they can always obtain the information that guides them for decision-making from other sources from 
within or outside of the company, whilst others believe that the current reporting system is outdated:
...we do not need such reports (SR) since we can obtain information relating to strategy from other 
sources. HF2
….information that guides us on whether to buy or sell these shares are no longer available from annual 
reports, but from newspapers and social media. That ought to be addressed otherwise the accounting 
and auditing profession would lose their credibility. FB1
Generally, it was noted from these meetings and interviews, that individual shareholders and faith 
based activist investors desire SR more that the institutional shareholders because they see it as the only 
way by which they could gauge the strategy and value of the investee company. The desire for more 
information is indicative of the reduced reliance on historical information which may not be indicative 
of future performance due to the prevalence of heightened manufactured risks and reduced risks. This 
view is re-echoed by King and Atkins (2016) thus:
By focusing only on the financial statements, the CFO and the user are ignoring important informa-
tion about the business of the company. Without the company’s long-term strategy being disclosed and 
showing that the sustainability issues material to the business of the company have been embedded into 
its strategy, the decision of investing in the equity of that company by just relying on earnings is an 
uninformed one. (p97)
Three distinct issues became clear from the above. Firstly, there is a dissatisfaction with the existing 
reporting system. Some shareholders are wary of the sustainability report which is not certified by the 
auditors, and its ‘boiler plate’ nature. This calls for the rethinking of the existing reporting system and the 
training being offered to accountants that prepare and certifies these reports. Arising from the inadequacy 
of the sustainability is the drive to access risk information by shareholders. Interview data suggests that 
individual, faith based and social activist shareholders can access relevant risk information from IR 
meetings from questions asked at such meetings. However, the other institutional investors believe that 
they can access such information from their representatives on the board. Thirdly is that the shareholders 
desire a risk reporting system which meets today’s requirement of being available online and real time.
Interview data confirms the Giddens (1990) hypothesis on the inverse relationship existing between 
risk and trust, especially in an environment typified by proliferation of risk knowledge. The narrative 
nature of the sustainability report makes shareholders to directly juxtapose the information supplied to 
them via sustainability reports with what they obtain from other sources especially on biodiversity and 
climate change. As climate change is an uncharted territory for humanity, seeming “organised irrespon-
sibility” and the use of “precautionary principle” of doing nothing is likely to be prevalent (Beck, 1994), 
making shareholders themselves to develop re-embedding mechanisms such as responsible investment 
behaviour, which includes divestment from stranded assets.
169
Valuation Challenges in Stranded Asset Scenarios
 
Discounting Future Cash Flows
Given the concerns of shareholders for diversification from stranded assets based on evidence from IR 
meetings (see section 6.1), and the growing urge for risk reporting (see section 6.2), it is pertinent that 
we discuss the effects of the options of the various applicable discount rates on the capitalisation of 
future projected income from stranded assets. Should we set zero discount rate, constant discount rate 
or variable rate? From existing literature, setting zero discount rates rate is applicable where economic 
agents postpone their immediate benefits for the use of future generations by making sacrifices now, 
which increases future cash flows. For instance engaging in afforestation or developing technology to 
absorb atmospheric carbon. Under such scenario, zero discounting may be applicable to future economic 
benefits due to the expectations that they would yield higher PV than the current cash flows (see Mad-
dison, 2001; Lopez et al, 2006). Setting such discount rate is unacceptable as the empirical evidence 
(see table 1) shows a downward trend in market capitalisation, which evidences decline in underlying 
future cash flows, and there are no strong evidence of oil and gas companies developing carbon-capture 
technology. Setting a constant discount rate is equally objectionable in the valuation of income from 
stranded assets due to the uncertainties attached to the future income.
As a result of the non-plausibility of the discount rate mentioned above, we considered upward dis-
counting of future cash flows whereby higher rates are applied to the cash flows as they approach the 
set date of the EU-wide ban 2050 and beyond. Since there is growing uncertainty about the future cash 
flows, some researchers (see Dasgupta, 2001; Pearce et al, 2003) have argued that decreasing weight 
ought to be attached to the cash flows as they approach 2050, indicating the need to increasing the ap-
plicable discount rates. These cash flows would accrue the future benefits minus the expected future 
payments which may include the financialisation of the effects of environmental degradation (GtCO2 and 
other externalities such as health hazards) together with projected fines and penalties. This may also be 
applied side-by-side with alternative recommendations (see Gravelle and Smith, 2001; and Brouwer et 
al., 2005) that benefits accruing from such companies should be segmented and capitalised at different 
discount rates based on the vulnerability of such earnings to environmental damage. All these shows the 
effect of factoring the unmitigated ‘manufactured risks’ on negative outlook in the future of oil and gas 
industry. Estimating the environmental costs may be particularly problematic as there are no generally 
accepted metrics for the financialisation of ESG costs despite the noticeable rise in the number of ESG 
rating agencies such as Thompson Reuters, FTSE4GOOD, FTSE Russel, Sustainalytics.
The concept of stranded asset is challenging the traditional basis of valuation due to the availability of 
new knowledge about the existence of manufactured risks which is putting question mark on streams of 
future cash flows as well as the existence of material environmental costs which must now be taken into 
consideration. The misalignment of the risks and benefits on one hand, and the continuous application of 
previously known cash flow discounting model where the predictability of future cash flows have been 
altered, is likely to further push back the likelihood of finding a quick solution to the valuation problem, 
bearing in mind, the “juggernaut nature of modernity” (Giddens, 1990) which we continually experience.
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DISCUSSION
The existing financial and sustainability reporting systems are inadequate in helping shareholders to 
play their actively. This inadequate reporting could be traced to misalignments in the social system 
which continually evolves, which Giddens (1990) compares to a “runaway engine of enormous power” 
(p. 139). It is expected that as society continues to evolve, there are likely to be even more changes in 
the social and financial systems, which makes the development of re-embedding mechanisms such as 
RI logic imperative. Some (Ramus and Montiel, 2005; KPMG, 2017) have suggested that the existing 
stewardship system as not supporting proper valuation because it is grounded in the short-termism 
philosophy, whilst Solomon et al (2013) and Bowen (2014) have noted that these short-term thinking 
are have egged on greenwashing and impression management rather that RI logic. Some Shareholder 
view attendance at IR meetings as conferring advantage on attendees as they are able to discuss strategy 
matters which are not available to the general public. The concern is that by so doing, they can use the 
information acquired to engage in insider dealings. It is also expected that the same level of detailed 
attention being paid to quarterly analysis of financial performance ought to be paid to the strategy is-
sues being deliberated at IR meetings in order to generate more useful market information in the spirit 
of transparency and accountability.
Based on the above, there is a growing desire for risk reporting to replace the existing historical 
reporting system which places emphasis on past performance and profits rather than the ability of a 
business to generate future cash flows. Concerns for future expectations are much more now than in the 
past due to uncertainties attached to the future of the companies in the extractive sector. If this need is 
sustained, it means that the future of financial and sustainability report is uncertain, as this would also 
have implications for the training of professional accountants. King and Solomon (2016) have therefore 
called for the restructuring of the training education being offered to accountants in view of the chang-
ing environment. IR meetings showed a divergence between the need of the shareholder and those of 
the directors. Whilst the directors are interested in stewardship, the shareholders are forward-looking, 
interested in appraising the effect of the environment on the future value of the firm. This agrees with 
some views (Adam, 2004; Gray, 2006) stressing the need for an overhaul of the existing reporting system, 
and the need for new innovative and imaginative ideas where ESG reporting can serve as a proxy for risk 
management. For instance, biodiversity reporting is a relatively new development, calls are being made 
to include material biodiversity costs in the annual reports of companies (see Rimmel and Jonall, 2013; 
Atkins et al., 2015). The usual response from directors of these companies is that there are no accounting 
standards on this, and that it imposes additional costs on the reporting entity. Nevertheless, the quest for 
going concern information in this area may quickly transform the reporting landscape in the near future.
Some of the recent developments, like the TCFD has put forward some recommendations for improving 
climate related disclosures in sustainability reports, whether they be quantitative or qualitative. Again, 
these disclosures are meant to be voluntary, and they cover issuance of two core disclosures: climate 
related financial disclosures and climate related scenarios. The climate related financial disclosures 
cover elements of core ESG issues namely risk management, strategy, governance and KPIs, whilst the 
scenario report addresses the organisation’s climate resilience strategies. They are also recommending 
scenario analysis that enables companies to think about the future as per climate change with range of 
outcomes since the effect of climate change is uncertain. The TCFD scenario analysis is similar in con-
cept to the ‘what if’ model developed by Petkov et al, (2016) to report climate change risks indicators. 
These reports are meant to help investors understand how the organisation assess risks and opportuni-
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ties relating to climate change. This is likely to help investors to appraise the resilience build into their 
portfolio. These two reports are also in tandem with Integrated Reporting <IR> which views capital 
from an accountability rather than a stewardship point of view. In addition, <IR> do not adequately 
connect financial reporting and environmental risks (Atkins et al., 2015; Carels et al., 2014; Solomon 
and Maroun, 2012) as there is no incentives for the monetisation of environmental costs. Comparatively, 
the UK fares better than other jurisdictions in the quest to meet the TCFD requirements, although only 
four out of seven requirements have been met to date (see table 10.2). However, again these does not 
meet all the four requirements listed above, especially the need to certify these reports independently 
by an auditor. In the IR meetings, investors have raised concerns over the non-certification of SRs, and 
this is confirmed via interviews of UKSA members in chapter 5. The accounting profession and the 
financial reporting regulators are sluggish in making narrative reporting or <IR> compulsory, which 
may frustrate any gains made through the TCFD initiative.
With climate change persistently appearing on the agenda of investors, information on the quality 
of income and assets based on the environmental risks is likely to continue to increase. Unfortunately, 
the existing accounting standards either on valuation, or the systematic writing off of assets over their 
economic useful lives, are inadequate as they do not foresee effects of climate change which is able to 
alter the value income or assets disproportionately. In recent times however, some organisations such 
as S&P Global Ratings have developed “management and Global” criteria for measuring ESG risks, 
although such universal criteria capturing income and assets exposure to ESG risks are yet to be applied 
in reporting by companies. All these are evidences of the transition that the accounting profession is in 
right now, and climate change is playing an important role.
This paper sets out to investigate the challenges being faced by sell-side analysts in engaging with 
companies with material stranded assets through the lens of Becksian risk society theory. The research 
seeks to unravel the usefulness of sustainability reports in deriving the intrinsic value of energy companies 
in the UK, and whether they take Environmental Social and Governance (ESG) factors into consider-
ation in doing so. Qualitative data were collected via dual methods comprising longitudinal participant 
observation at IR meetings and interview of sell-side analysts. Findings indicate dissatisfaction with the 
existing risk reporting system is a key factor in divestment decisions and asset stranding. The growing 
Responsible Investment (RI) awareness notwithstanding, the inadequate risk reporting system continues 
to represent a major source of agitation amongst shareholders and analysts, making the overhaul of the 
current financial reporting system inevitable
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
This paper sets out to investigate the challenges being faced by sell-side analysts in engaging with com-
panies with material stranded assets through the lens of Becksian risk society theory. We found that as 
the existing financial reporting system is found inadequate, investors are exhibiting adaptive tendencies 
by placing less reliance on the financial reports, and attending IR meetings in order to get the neces-
sary information which are not disclosed in the financial and sustainability reports. The IR meetings 
are originally designed to discuss financial reports. However, an evolving trend whereby the issues be-
ing discussed in such meeting are much more of strategy and how to reduce going concern risks, have 
necessitated a proper documentation of the minutes of such meetings, and making them available to all 
shareholders in order to deepen the risk information available in the market place.
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New developments in the field of financial reporting such as the integrated reporting system <IR> 
are not encompassing a very important information need for valuation, which is risk reporting, and 
sensitivity to environmental risks in an interactive basis. This will have implications for the future 
training of professional accounting professionals as well as the auditors. These are manifestations of a 
risk society where the issue of risk brings about reflexive modernisation. This research focused on the 
attitude of shareholders and sell-side analysts in the UK. However in order to develop this work further, 
it is proposed that future research may take a quantitative approach to measuring the effectiveness of 
the information gathered at IR meetings. Also, future researchers may underpin their work through 
another theory other than the risk society theory, and they may also apply other methodology other that 
participant observation at IR meetings as well as semi-structured interviews.
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